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ImportControls
Wenow come to the cornerstone of the Colombian system for restraining the
demand for imports: the controls mandating registration of all imports with a
specified agency—during 1971, it was INCOMEX—authorized to prohibit or
to require prior approval of import transactions. I will first explain the terms in
the Colombian import licensing system, and follow this by a sketch of its
historical evolution. The core of the chapter is a detailed examination of how
the system worked in about 1970—7 1. On the basis of that description, I will 9
advance some hypotheses regarding the biases arising from the import-licens-
ing process, which I will test in Chapter 6. Finally, I will take a look at some




SOME KEY DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
in
The Colombian government records the import process at several points: it
first requires the registration with INCOMEX of all intentions to import goods
except for "minor" imports; these intentions become registered only after
they are approved; they are recorded at f.o.b. values. For items on the free list
approval is granted almost automatically. When the goods come into the
country and clear customs, they are recorded at customs at c.i.f. values.
Finally, when the importer or his bank draws foreign exchange from the
central bank, those exchange disbursements are noted. To obtain foreign
exchange, the importer must present proof that the goods have cleared 0
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TABLE 5-1
Merchandise Imports: Registrations, Customs Values, and Exchange Disbursements,
1963—72
(annual averages in millions of current U.S. dollars)
1963—66 1967—70 1971—72
Total registrations (f.o.b.) 552.1 706.2 843.4
Reimbursable 484.4 596.1 748.1
Ordinary draft 390.8 414.9 639.4
Compensation agreements 38.8 60.0 45.5
AID credits 20.2 86.0 18.1
Other credits 27.0 16.9 13.3
Special import-export systems 7.6 18.3 31.9
Nonreimbursable 676 110.1 95.3
With foreign loans 18.9 71.7 56.2
Other 4.8.7 38.5 39.1
Merchandise imports (customs, c.i.f.) 555.0 645.2 847.0
Exchange disbursements for imports (f.o.b.) 371.0 475.3 633.7
1'
a SOURCE: BdlR.RdBdIR, various issues, and IMF-IFS, various issues. See text for explana-
•r tion of terms and classification.
S
customs. In Table 5-1 these three different magnitudes are shown for recent
11 years. Allowing for lags, registrations and customs values are roughly equal. It
appears that the c.i.f.-f.o.b. differential is offset by cancellations, postregistra-
tion discounts, and nonuse of some registrations. Exchange disbursements are
lower than import values for the simple reason that many imports are financed
by foreign credits or covered by compensation agreements; the servicing of
such debt is recorded under other items.
The lag between application for an import license and its approval, which
implies registration for goods on the prior list, has fluctuated considerably
since World War II. During 1970—71 it averaged between one and one and a
it half months. The lag between registration and the time the goods actually go
S through customs depends, of course, on the nature of the commodity; it is said
to average four or five months. The lag between arrival and exchange dis-
S bursement, for those imports not financed by long-term credit, ranges between
one and twenty months.
The average link between actual imports (CUSTOMS) and registration
n (REGISTR.) can be seen in the following regression, using annual dollar data
ed for 1951 through 1972 (t statistics are in parentheses):
-4-
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(CUSTOMS), =94.18+ 0.55 (REGJSTR.), + 0.31 (REGJSTR.) (5-1)
(2.19)(5.30) (2.70)
R2 =0.88;F statistic= 71.58;DW =2.92
From 1962 through 1969 this regression yields alternating under- and
overestimates of actual imports. Thus, predicted customs imports for 1963 are
7 per cent above actual ones; for 1964, 6 per cent below; for 1965, 16 per cent
above, and so on. The missing explanatory variable could well be past, actual,
and expected exchange-rate behavior, as expectations of devaluation, say,
would induce holders of registered licenses to speed up the arrival of and
payment for the merchandise. But experiments in which lagged and leading
exchange-rate changes were entered in regression 5-1 yielded on the whole
poor results. In some regressions, the actual percentage of changes in the real
average import exchange rate a year ahead had a positive sign and t statistics
of about 1.2, presumably picking up realized expectations about its move-
ments. But clearly, in any given year there are ad hoc factors influencing the
lag between customs flow and registration; for example, a plausible reason for
the 1964 underestimate of 6 per cent in regression 5-1 relates to doubts that the
condition of relative import ease would last long, provoking a quick realization s
of registered intentions to import. And once this happens in a given year, the a
opposite can be expected in the next. Tight domestic credit conditions, on the
other hand, will induce the postponement of import arrivals and payments, a I
procedure facilitated by the relative ease of obtaining rollover of import
credits. The variability of the lag between licensing, arrival, and payment has
often caused short-run disturbances in credit and exchange management.
Regression 5-1 indicates that 55 per cent of registrations are, on average, tf
turned into actual imports within the same year, suggesting an average lag V
between licensing and arrival of five to six months. Note, however, that the
coefficients for both registration variables add up to only 0.86, and that longer C
lags yielded insignificant results. d
INCOMEX and its predecessors have classified registrations according to ii
type of payment to which they give rise, type of importer, and particular p
regime to which the imports are subject. fil
The classification of payments used during 1970—71 for imports is pre-
sented in Table 5-1. The distinction between reimbursable and nonreimburs-
able imports is less helpful than it appears, because although all nonreimburs-
able imports are financed by long- or medium-term credits, or involve imports
of direct foreign investors or gifts and donations, not all reimbursable imports
are covered by current exchange earnings. The distinction turns out to hinge b
on whether the foreign exchange used to pay for imports is or is not at the 11
disposal of the Banco de Ia Repdblica, directly or indirectly. Thus, imports 1(SOME KEY DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS 127
financed by AiD credits deposited with the central bank are reimbursable,
while those financed by loans from IBRD or IADB, whose cash is kept in
Washington, are considered nonreimbursable. Imports from countries with
which Colombia has bilateral payments agreements, as well as those from
d LAFFA, come under the reimbursable category, as reciprocal credit deals are
directly handled by the central bank. That part of foreign investment directly
involving machinery imports is nonreimbursablé; other parts, which may
involve a dollar inflow deposited in the central bank to pay for other imports,
would be reimbursable.
The distinction according to type of importer is of more general interest.
•1 Published import registrations are subdivided into three categories: industry,
commerce, and official. For internal use, INCOMEX has a somewhat more
al complicated classification entailing a fourth major group, "occasional"
requests, made up mainly of import applications from construction firms,
professionals, private individuals, and even some public agencies, as well as
other minor subdivisions. In published registrations, "industry" includes
•r imports to be transformed and used directly by those requesting the license;
"commerce," those to be resold by established commercial firms, without
)fl substantially altering the imported item. Approved "occasional" requests
appear mainly under "commerce" in published registration reports. The
"official" category covers imports destined for the public sector; however,
a INCOMEX subdivides these applications into commercial and industrial cate-
gories for internal use, and published data also contain under "industry"
as imports of some public enterprises. Partly as a result of foreign "tied aid" and
partly because of protectionist pressures, all official imports must by law go
through the prior-licensing procedure, i.e., they are excluded from the free
list.
Colombia has no state trading agencies outside the quasi-official Coffee
Growers' Federation (in principle a private group) and IDEMA, in charge of
distributing basic foodstuffs, such as wheat. The former handles directly a
major share of coffee exports, while the latter frequently imports in bulk,
particularly from countries whose export trade is in state hands. IDEMA has
from time to time been the recipient of large government subsidies.
Only approved (registered) license requests are published; during 1971, of
all registered reimbursable imports 56percent fell into the industry category;
24 per cent, into commerce; and 20 per cent, into official; and for 1970 the
corresponding figures were 53,29,and 19 per cent. It may be estimated that
during 1971 total requests, including those rejected, followed a roughly similar
breakdown, with the share for commerce slightly higher than the shares for
industry and official. Data problems do not allow a clear determination of















The large share of import demand and of actual imports accounted for by
direct users, whether private or public, is remarkable and reflects the small
share of consumer goods in the import bill. Note also that because of what is
known about import prohibitions and INCOMEX policies, a large fraction of
potential importers do not bother to apply for permits. Furthermore, many
small entrepreneurs and individuals not used to dealing with government —
bureaucraciesmay get discouraged even when their potential applications 2
have a good chance of being approved. 3
All importable items fell under one of three regimes or lists: prohibited,
free, or prior license.' It will be seen that the coverage of these lists fluctuated 8
considerably during the 1960s. During 1971, about 16 per cent of all items 9
(including subcategories) to which the Colombian tariff is applicable were 11
placed on the prohibited list. The figures in Table 5-2showthat the list 12
includedcandidates for agricultural protectionism in rich and poor countries
alike (e.g., meat, corn, dairy products, etc.), luxury products (e.g., furs,
18
precious metals, jewelry, velvets, etc.), and many items for which prohibi- 19
tions appeared redundant (e.g., coffee, cocoa, sugar, clothes, wood manufac- 20
tures, etc.). An eccentric who wished to import coffee into Colombia in 1971, 21
incidentally, would have faced not only a flat prohibition, but also a duty of 85 22
per cent if the bean was unroasted, or 170 per cent for roasted beans, plus a
prior deposit of 130 per cent. The list also included items such as arms and 58
habit-formingdrugs. Note that while among the tariff chapters identified in
Table 5-2,whichaccount for two-thirds of all prohibited items and contain 60
mainly consumer goods, the percentage of prohibitions was 66, for the rest of 61
the tariff only 6 per cent of the categories were prohibited. Under special
circumstances goods on the prohibited list can be imported, as under the
Vallejo Plan. During 1971, for example, nearly 1 per cent of all registered
reimbursable imports were on the prohibited list. It may be noted that some
goods are prohibited for most purposes, but subject to prior licenses for a few
others, e.g., some types of paper, prohibited except for use by the printing and
publishing industry. On the whole, the prohibited list included many items
which could be regarded as actual or potential exportable goods.
The free list, besides Vallejo Plan and LAFTA imports, included in
August 1971 only about 150 items, or 3 per cent of all categories in the tariff.
However, free-list items accounted for 29 per cent of all registered reimburs-
able imports in1971and 23 per cent of all registered imports (the free list was
limited to reimbursable imports). Free-list items can be brought into Colombia
without prior license; all that is required, in principle, besides payment of
duties and prior deposits is the registration of these imports with INCOMEX. m
Typically, that process is routine, but INCOMEX can challenge the dollar ot,
prices appearing in the registration; such control is justified on grounds of cl-
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TABLE 5-2





































Chapter Number and Description




2Meat and edible offal 20 20
3Fish, shellfish, and mollusks 18 10
4Milk and dairy products, eggs, honey 16 13
7Edible legumes, vegetables, plant roots, tubers 24 20
8Edible fruits and peels 74 69
9Coffee, tea, and spices 26 10
IIMilling foodstuffs, malt, starches 34 29
12Oilseeds, sundry seeds, industrial and medicinal
plants, fodder 61 27
15Animal and vegetable oils, fats 88 54
18Cocoa and its products 7 6
19Pastries, products based on flour, cereals, etc. 10 6
20Preserves of vegetables, plants, fruits 24 21
21Sundry foodstuffs 18 11
22Beverages, alcoholic drinks, vinegar 33 11
41Furs, leather, and their manufactures 26 11
44 Wood and its manufactures 35 25
58Rugs, felts, ribbons, embroidery, velvets, tulle,
etc. 61 49
60Knitted goods 25 24
61Other clothing and apparel 23 22
68Ceramics, glass, cement, and their manufactures 46 15
71Precious stones, metals, and their manufactures 38 16
Subtotal 707 469
Other chapters 3,643 235
Total 4,350 704
4
SOURCE: Datafrom Arancel de Aduanas(seeSource note to Table 4-4).
combating ovèrinvoicing, and can lead to denial of registration even of items
on the free list. The threat is notjust theoretical; e.g., some book imports were
held up in about 1972 for this reason. INCOMEX can also use a number of
bureaucratic excuses to delay processing free-list registrations for a few days.
Neither the "prohibited" nor the "free" list has always been true to its
name!
Goods on the free list included primarily some spare parts, certain raw
materials and intermediate products, scientific and medical equipment, and
other capital goods. Examples of the latter are harvesters, helicopters,
•chicken incubators, some electrical generators, tractors, and many types of
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engines. The remainder of the items on the lists included unmanufactured
copper, lead, zinc, aluminum; some types of steel and nickel sheets; and
newsprint, Of all tariff items (528) in chapters 84 and 85,whichinclude most
electrical and nonelectrical machinery and equipment, excluding transport,
nearly 10 per cent were on the free list. As with the tariff, import controls are
biased against the importation of used goods; it is explicitly stated in the
( regulations covering the free list that only new and unused merchandise can be
brought in under the list.2 i
Goods on neither the prohibited nor the free list were subject to prior r
licensing, which covered the bulk of imports. Items could be moved from one
list to another by a simple decision of INCOMEX. So long as a given e commodity remained on the free list,it could be said that its demand
depended only on income, prices, tariffs, etc.; but in reality this was so only so r
long as that demand stayed within the limits foreseen by the authorities. It has
not been unusual in the past for the control authorities to curtail or eliminate
the free list when demand pressure became too great; that is one reason why
in Chapter 3 no distinction was made among prohibited, prior license, and free
import lists when deriving the over-all import function.
I
Therewas a further distinction, primarily applied to industrial requests,
between globallicensesand ordinary or regular licenses. Global licenses,
started in 1965, applied basically to imports of capital goods for projects
exceeding U.S. $40,000, involving the creation, modernization, or expansion
of capacity, and, if granted, were simply an approval in principle to import. F
After obtaining a global license, an importer was typically given about
three months to apply for ordinary licenses. Extensions, however, were
possible; and longer time limits were also given, depending on the nature
of the project. When a company is planning new investment, for example, it
submits a description of the project, in the form of a feasibility study with a nine-
teen-page questionnaire, together with estimated import requirements to
f al
INCOMEX. which has a special section for analyzing these projects. The
motivation given for global licenses is to avoid a situation in which projects
are delayed by having, say, 90 per cent of import requirements approved but a
few critical requests rejected. Once a global license has been obtained, the Ui
normal expectation is that all required licenses, which must still be presented
for each individual item, will be approved.
Global licenses are not obligatory for investment projects, but highly at
convenient; they give the government an important tool for controlling private
capital formation, and entrepreneurs a way of committing the government to
the realization of a project. In the difficult year of 1967, global licenses worth re
U.S. $48.4 million were approved and license applications worth U.S. $7.4 rn
million were rejected. In 1969, approvals reached U.S. $110.2 million. The irA HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE IMPORT CONTROL SYSTEM 131
corresponding figure for 1970 was $84.7 million. In contrast, actual imports of
all capital goods during 1969—70 averaged U.S. $346.1 million annually.
A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE IMPORT
CONTROL SYSTEM3
In spite of an increase in the dollar value of Colombian exports from $81
- millionin 1938 to $284 million in 1948, more than a threefold increase in ten
years, foreign-exchange reserves declined during 1946—48, and the import and
exchange controls which were first put into effect during the Great Depression
became increasingly detailed and complex. As noted in Chapter 1, exchange-
rate policy appears to have become frozen by the peculiar circumstances
during and following World War II, leading to an overvaluation trend.
By 1949, import licenses were granted up to the limits of individual
I exchange quotas computed on the basis of the importer's production, sales,
and other criteria. During 1950, the allocation of exchange quotas to individual
importers began to be determined on the basis of their capital, expenses, and
total personnel. For some commodities, such as drugs and pharmaceuticals,
import licenses were issued without regard for the exchange quotas. Thus, the
s nonreimbursable category was already in use, and at that time it probably
included many imports financed with dollars acquired in the black market.
• Furthermore, licenses for the purchase of certain imports were given preferen-
t tial treatment.
This system was conducive to tinkering and proliferation of multiple
rates, and up until March 1951 numerous adjustments were made to exchange
t taxes, to proportions in the mixed rates, and to goods which could be
- importedoutside individual exchange quotas. Apparently there was consider-
) able criticism of the efficiency, fairness, and honesty with which the system
was run, and one of the directors of the control mechanism was even assassi-
S nated.
In March 1951, when the basic import rate was devalued to 2.5 pesos per
e U.S. dollar, a prohibited list of about 1,200 specified luxury or locally produced
ci items was created. But practically all licensing restrictions on imports were 4
removed,and major exchange taxes as well as mixed or multiple rates were
Y abolished. Imports still required registration, but this became a routine matter;
e if the application met all legal requirements registration was automatic. A
o minor stamp tax of 3 per cent was collected on all registrations; a few imports
h required prior approval of certain ministries (e.g., for health reasons, as in
4 many industrialized countries). Some items on the prohibited list could be
Ic imported if they originated in countries having either a balanced trade or132 LMPORT CONTROLS
barter and payments agreement with Colombia. Other prohibitions were lifted
if "export vouchers" (introduced in August 1952) issued for certain minor
exports were used to finance importation of the items otherwise prohibited, so
long as both the exports and imports related to the same foreign country.
During part of 1954 even the prohibited list was abolished and replaced with a
flat 40 per cent tax.
As the domestic boom got out of hand and coffee prices began to waver,
late in 1954, the authorities reintroduced exchange taxes and regulations
without, however, restricting most import registrations. First in October 1954
and then more thoroughly in February 1955 imports were reclassified and
stamp taxes on import registrations were drastically increased, while prohibi-
tions were once again enforced. Six import categories were created: preferen-
tial (raw materials for essential industries); other raw materials and essential
products; essential durable and semidurable goods; less essential goods,
importable only from certain countries; specified nonessential goods; and
prohibited (luxury) goods. Stamp taxes ranged from 3 to 100 per cent. Imports
of some foodstuffs were to be handled only by a special corporation. And late
in 1954 the granting of exchange for import payments was made contingent
upon arrival of the merchandise in Colombia, a regulation which had been
abolished in November 1951. J
The payments situation continued deteriorating during 1955 and 1956; it
appears that at that time attempts at control relied mainly on indirect meas-
ures, such as stamp taxes and the free-market rate, plus exchange control. In
other words, "essential" imports continued being registered freely and flood-
ing into the country, and they continued to make up the bulk of the import
bill,4 while the queues waiting to buy foreign exchange for 2.5 pesos at the
central bank became longer. By June 1956 authorities gave importers waiting
for exchange authorizations the option of buying exchange immediately at the
official rate of 2.5 pesos per dollar for half of the value of their pending
applications, if they obtained the other half in the free market, where the rate
at that time stood at about 4.7 pesos. By the end of 1956 that rate was 6.5
pesos. In October 1956, the payments crisis had provoked the closing of the
exchange registration office, except for consideration of applications for vital C
imports. It was reopened, with tighter regulations and prohibitions, in January
1957. Most import registrations were also suspended during those months, and
their easy granting came to an end; from January 1957 on, import control
became the first and major hurdle faced by potential importers before they
reached the exchange window.
Under the stabilization plan of June 1957 all imports were still subject to 4
registration,and lists of prohibited, free, and prior license imports were
established. This control system, which with further refinements was the one
still in effect during 1971, was consolidated by Law 1 of January 1959,A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE IMPORT CONTROL SYSTEM 133
Beginning in 1957, prior exchange registration was also enforced systemati-
cally for import payments, requiring submission of an import registration plus
evidence that the goods had entered Colombia. Importers were given the
choice of paying through a free market (at 6.2 pesos at the end of 1957) in
a which case they were exempted from the 10 per cent remittance tax. Estab-
lishment of higher import exchange rates and tougher standards for prior
r import deposits made it possible to relax import-licensing requirements for
some commodities; during the second half of 1957, for example, two-thirds of
4 all import registrations were on the free list, and only one-third (mainly capital
goods) fell under the prior license list. But the rate of refused requests for
goods in the prior license list is said to have been high, nearly 40 per cent by
value of requests during those difficult months.
al After the commercial arrears had been liquidated, and the payments crisis
and inflationary pressures dampened by the austerity measures of 1957 and
Id 1958, growth began to pick up again in a climate of stability. Throughout 1959,
•Is 1960, and even 1961, import controls remained stringent but fairly steady.
te Some even saw a trend toward liberalization as exchange reserves recovered.
nt Certainly imports rose steadily from their 1958 low.
Difficulties in the world coffee market continued to be used as the major
justification for rigorous import controls. By 1960 it was felt that about one-
it fourth or one-third of potential import demand was restricted by the licensing
is- system, and that this was done more by flat prohibitions, frequently of
In protectionist intent, than by rejection of license applications. About half of the
items in the tariff were at that time on the prohibited list. Among registered
)rt imports, the share of those on the free list had declined slightly to 60 per cent
he from about 65 per cent in 1959. The value of import license requests rejected
ng as a percentage of the value of all license applications fluctuated at about 15
he per cent throughout 1958, 1959, and 1960. These rates of rejection underesti-
ng mate the strength of import demand not only because of the existence (and
ite changing size) of the prohibited list, but also because the Superintendency of
Imports, and later INCOMEX, made it a practice to discourage applications
he doomed to failure by reacting negatively to informal inquiries. The depressed
tal conditions of the world coffee market also led Colombian authorities about
try this time to use the licensing mechanism to discriminate by source of imports,
nd as part of bilateral barter deals involving mostly new coffee exports. Imports
rol not normally permitted were occasionally allowed from bilateral partners
tey (e.g., motor vehicles, giving Colombian roads an ecumenical assortment
which included Russian, Polish, East German, and Czech vehicles) in
to exchange for coffee sold at de facto discounts perhaps as high as 20 per cent.
ere During 1961 about U.S. $30 million of imports were licensed under barter
me and bilateral agreements.
'59. In Chapter 7, I will discuss in detail the events surrounding the 1962134 IMPORT CONTROLS
devaluation and the 1965—66 liberalization episode. Here it will be sufficient to
note that import controls went through spasmodic tightening and loosening TI
cycles: the free list, which by mid-1965 was vanishing, covered 80 per cent of
all registered imports in October 1966. By December 1966 there was no free
list. Throughout 1967 import controls were rigorously enforced; there was of
practically no free list, and it is said that of the total number of import license of
requests presented, about 40 per cent were rejected. In terms of value, about in
25percent of total requests were turned down; the percentage was lower for dt
global and nonreimbursable requests, and higher for reimbursable ones. Steep Pt
prior import deposits were reintroduced, and exchange controls were tight- pr
ened. Imports dwindled; their customs value in 1967 was 26 per cent below m
1966, while the drop in registrations was 18 per cent. Only after May 1968 did
the free list regain some significance: free-list registrations were only 4 per
cent of all reimbursable import registrations in 1967, rising to 12 per cent in
1968. The liberalization rock continued to be pushed uphill, slowly, once m
again. By 1970, the free list had reached 20 per cent of all reimbursable th
registrations (17 per cent of all registrations).
Growing foreign-exchange earnings, due both to the success of export-
promoting policies and to favorable world market conditions, coupled with T
inflationary pressures induced a quickening of the liberalization trend during h -
1972—74.In August 1973 the prohibited list was eliminated, placing the 705 re
items then in that category under the prior license list. During 1973 and 1974,
about 1,400 items under the prior license list were transferred to the free list;
these were mostly items for which import permits had been readily granted
during earlier years. During the first half of 1974 about 93 per cent of import er4
requests under the prior list were being approved; rejections involved either
protectionist motivation or simply a careless presentation of the request in the
eyes of the authorities. It was expected that by the end of 1974, 50 per cent of 01
all imports would be entering Colombia under the free list. On the other hand, th
whileinflation stimulated the relaxation of import controls during 1973 and re.
1974, it also led to a large number of exportprohibitionsof both rural and w.
industrial commodities.




Beginning in March 1967 the import and exchange-control system took the d
basic shape it had in about 1971. It should be borne in mind, however, that the in
description contained in this section provides a snapshot of a system evolving bi
in the direction of liberalization, and still engaged in administrative "fine di
tuning." orTHE OPERATION OF IMPORT CONTROLS DURING 1971 135
The Processing of License Requests.
All potential importers must present INCOMEX with a detailed descrip-
tion of the goods they wish to purchase, including intended means and timing
of payment, and must also complete a questionnaire (following Resolution 15
e of 1967) giving company information on payroll, number of workers, capacity,
*
importsduring current and previous three years, income and sales taxes paid
during current and previous three years, minor exports for the same period,
previous imports of the products intended to be imported, inventories of these
products and their expected life, and some additional data. A separate form
N must usually be completed for each commodity, although exceptions to this
d rule are possible; slightly different forms of request are prescribed by Resolu-
tion 15 for industry, commerce, and government.
The INCOMEX staff first checks to see whether all the required docu-
mentation and information have been presented fully and accurately. Besides
• the import description and the Resolution 15 form, importers must show
evidence of tax settlements and that they have made the required prior import
deposits. In principle, then, the mechanism of import control can reinforce the
:h Treasury's efforts to reduce tax evasion, particularly among commercial
houses. At this stage, import applications can be returned (not officially
rejected) on grounds of improper completion of forms. INCOMEX5 argues
4, that such devolutions are done on purely technical grounds (e.g., because the
description of the proposed import is sketchy, which may lead to trouble at
customs when it arrives in the country) and complains that the company
rt employees who carelessly completed the forms then call such devolutions
er rejections to protect themselves. Problems arise particularly with new or
complex products. In fact, the punctiliousness with which INCOMEX insists
of on the quality of information on import requests can be adjusted depending on
the pressure of import demand. Whether an import request is returned or
rejected, the potential importer can submit a new one at once. During 1971, it
was estimated that of the total value of requested imports, only about 3 per
cent were returned because of insufficient information or procedural mistakes.
If the application is satisfactory in form, the INCOMEX staff next
examines whether products similar to those requested are produced locally.
Extensive files on domestic production have been built up during the last few
years. There is at this point a frank and clear protectionist bias; in case of
doubt, the presumption is that local goods are indeed fully satisfactory candi-
he dates for import replacement, at least in their physical attributes. Prospective
he importers whose requests have been turned down on these grounds bear the
ng burden of demonstrating to INCOMEX that the local product isin fact
ne different from the proposed imports because of quality, product specification,
or other reasons. Price differences, unless extreme, are not considered valid136 IMPORT CONTROLS
grounds for importing. INCOMEX occasionally brings together the prospec-
tive importer and the local import-competing producer, to iron out serious
disagreements regarding prices, quality, and specifications. INCOMEX offi-
d cials occasionally visit plants of import-competing firms to verily their capac-
a
ity, output quality, and other characteristics, a time-consuming, subjective,
1,L
and ad hoc practice.
ua
As a third step, the INCOMEX staff looks closely at the unit dollar price
of the potential import. The point here is not to keep track of margins between
Colombian and world prices but to control overinvoicing of raw materials and Ti parts, particularly by subsidiaries of foreign companies buying from their
parents. INCOMEX and other Colombian officials argue, for example, that
pharmaceutical companies operating in Colombia but owned abroad have
been shown to have inflated the value of their imports of raw materials as a im
way of disguising profit remittances.6 Thus, import control emerges also as a ea
tool for regulating intracompany transfers of profits, particularly by foreign lin
investors in the import-competing sector. The need for such regulation, of
f tb
course, would disappear if these companies did not receive protection against In
imports of finished products. Even items on the free list may be held up if
there is a suspicion that dollar prices declared in the registration request are
out of line with world prices.
Since much direct foreign investment consists of imports of machinery Ci
and equipment, their registered value later on becomes part of the base on
which under Colombian regulations allowable profit remittances abroad are ru
computed. It is thus important for the control system to check on the real bef
(international) value of the machinery, which is typically brought in with pr4
nonreimbursable licenses. Stories are told of gross overvaluation in some
license requests, designed to inflate the value of foreign investment.
All the above procedures are handled by the Junta de Importaciones ra4
staff, whose members do not have the power to reject or accept the applica-
tions (although, as noted above, they can return applications on procedural
grounds). That power, including the option of approving an application in part, dol
lies in the Junta de Importaciones itself, a body of five permanent members,
including the head of INCOMEX. Decisions on all prior license applications, loq
totaling roughly 150,000 per year, must be made by this body, which handles
about 500 applications per day. The work load is even higher than implied, as
the daily tasks are carried out typically by only three members of the junta, sly
since the other two, particularly the INCOMEX head, have other duties. The
technical staff of the junta is also small, with about fifteen professionals plus be
supporting employees. In spite of this staggering burden, the junta is kept do
deliberately small to minimize the danger of corruption. The same reason is Di
given for keeping its operations in Bogota, in spite of pressure from various pr
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sionsare, in principle, public. Under Article 75ofLaw 444ofMarch 1967,
us INCOMEX must publish weekly all import permits granted, as well as other
11- data on its operations. Decisions on rejections have been published off and on;
Ic- publication of rejections stimulated fraudulent activities for a while by individ-
uals who offered the unlucky applicants false contacts which presumably
would improve their chances in future applications. Since 1967 the turnover of
ice junta members has been low: for the three slots which are not ex officio there
en have been only eight members during the last five years (two died on the job).
nd The junta is widely respected for its hard work and honesty; it does lead a
eir fishbowl existence.
- Each month, the Junta de Importaciones receives from the Junta Mone-
Lye taria, the top monetary authority, an over-all foreign-exchange budget for all
s a imports, which is determined on the basis of actual and expected exchange
s a earnings. The import junta then regulates its approvals to keep within that
ign limit. It may also be noted that it dislikes public announcements of changes in
•of the budget, on the grounds that to do so may disturb its method of operation.
nst In particular, rumors of a cut in the monthly limit are said to produce sharp
if increases in license applications.
are
ery Criteria for Evaluating License Requests.
on The junta members are the first to admit that they follow no fast and rigid
are rules when deciding on applications (although unhelpful lists of "criteria" can
real be found in the relevant legislation, as in Article 77 of Law 444) and that the
iith process is highly subjective. There are no quotas for particular products, nor
me for firms, nor for regions. The major criterion is a protectionist one, but
occasionally imports are permitted if the quality of domestic output deterio-
rates markedly, or if domestic prices become unacceptably high. While junta
'Ca- members say all the right things about scaring local monopolistic positions by
iral such actions, the implementation is ad hoc, with protectionist sentiment
art, dominating. Throughout the 1960s, imports on the prior license list have been
ers, informally subdivided into three groups: those for which licensing depends on
local supply conditions of competing products, those generally approved, and
Iles those generally disapproved, but which are kept on the prior list to discourage
as monopolistic practices by domestic producers. The protectionist bias also
nta, showed in the occasional practice during the l960s of transferring items from
-rhe the free to the prior license or prohibited category as soon as a new plant
,lus began to produce locally a previously importable good (that transfer was often
(ept done before the plant began to operate, to ward off inventory accumulation).
IS During more recent years, however, the number of items transferred to the
bUS prohibited list dwindled. But the import control mechanism remained a key
• tool for protecting large new ventures, such as the automobile industry, for138 IMPORT CONTROLS
which special regimes and policies were established. Junta officials defend
their protectionist bias bluntly: Given other policies and circumstances out-
side their control (exchange-rate policy and coffee prices, for example) and
given the need to ration foreign exchange, what better procedure can they
follow than to ask potential importers whether or not they have checked to see
whether the product they wish to bring in can be found within Colombia?
Junta officials say that when in doubt itis better to deny a request on
protectionist grounds, a decision which after all can be reversed, than to allow
imports damaging to a local producer, a decision more difficult to offset. A last
argument given by the junta members in favor of their protectionist stance may
baffle the pure trade theorist: Since very few firms export their entire output,
they say, weakening the local base of most firms by allowing "excessive"
competition from imports will hurt their exporting capacity. As I noted in
Chapter 2, this argument has short-run validity in a setting of monopolistic
competition; its validity for the long run, however, is doubiful under standard a
assumptions regarding firm behavior. a
The process of establishing whether or not there is domestic production
of a given item is not without complications and loopholes. A given large r
company, for example, can have a subsidiary declare that it does not produce n
a given product locally, so that the mother company may be allowed to import
it. The same subsidiary may, however, declare to INCOMEX that it does
produce the particular item when a competitor of the large company requests
a license. Given the limited staff of the Juntade Importaciones, it is not always
possible to check on these ambiguities. It is said that, particularly during 1965, a
subsidiaries were used in the way described. For some commodities, such as
machine tools, it becomes difficult to establish whether local production of the
right quality and design is available, as goods of that kind are often made to
order. C
Some junta members admit favoring applications from less developed
regions within Colombia, and from firms with good records in nontraditional
exports (with or without the Vallejo Plan). As discussed below, the granting of
global licenses typically involves negotiations regarding export targets. Firms
with large tax payments are allegedly favored over those paying few taxes, iii
even if there is no evidence of tax evasion. The argument given is that the
government has a fiscal interest in channeling imports toward those firms that
are good tax-yielding partners of the public sector, which chooses to use large
tax payments as prima facie evidence of efficiency in the use of imported .
inputs.Although the junta looks closely at past imports of firms requesting
fresh licenses, it claims to take into account the needs of new importers, again
"by ear." Installed capacity is looked at, but so is employment; there is no
obvious a priori reason to expect such a subjective process by itself to lead to
a bias in favor of capital-intensive activities greater than one in favor of labor- C
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d intensive firms. Some junta members claim that their decisions are also
influenced by the state of labor relations in the firm requesting a license. Since
1 good labor relations are likely to be associated with high wages (and a relatively
small labor force), a bias in favor of capital intensity may be introduced this
way.
The Junta de Importaciones also examines the actual and expected
inventory levels of applicants and turns down a request if stocks are deemed
excessive. Inventories for four to six months of production are considered
reasonable, and are encouraged to save INCOMEX the paper work involved
tay in more frequent requests associated with lower inventories.
Ut,
Biases in the Evaluation Process.
This gentlemanly case-by-case style of import control leads to biases not
ird always fully recognized by those in charge of its operations.7 Given the burden
• of work and the speed with which applications must be handled, there is an
• inevitable tendency to accept without much analysis most "reasonable"
rge requests from established, well-known (i.e., large) companies and to examine
ice more closely and reject, in case of doubt or exchange stringency, those of less
• well-known, smaller newcomers, many of which may not even bother to
)eS apply. The junta prides itself, with good reason, on remaining open to com-
•sts plaints from importers, and incredibly its members find time to listen to an
unending stream of petitioners, whether powerful or not. Furthermore, it
65, arguesthat at times of exchange stringency, proportional cuts in import
as requests are larger for bigger than for smaller firms, and that it tends more
the readily to overlook faulty request forms from small than from large importers.
to But on balance, the larger and better-known importers find it easier than
others to communicate with the junta. Given the Colombian milieu, poten-
)ed tial small importers may actually exaggerate in their own.minds the complica-
nal tions of dealing with INCOMEX, housed incidentally in imposing offices on
of some of the highest floors of the tallest building of Bogota.8 Some junta
ms officials candidly admit that this may be so, but because of their strong belief
es, in the necessity of control, they argue that there are no other practical ways of
the handling the enormous mass of actual and potential applications. What is so
•hat ,wrong, they ask, with tilting in favor of applications from long-established
rge corporations, with honorable records, and of being skeptical of new and
•ted unknown applicants, who may turn out to be no better than phony industrial-
:ing ists, disguised smugglers, and black-market operators? In the Colombian
social setting, where most people who count know each other directly or
no indirectly, it is not difficult for control officials to persuade themselves that all
•ito legitimate requests are sooner or later handled appropriately. Another justifi-
or- cation given for a bias against some small import requests is the fear that such140 IMPORT CONTROLS
requests are simply a way of seeking legal window dressing for contraband. A
shop, it is alleged, may rely mainly on smuggled imports but use an approved
import license as a cover-up for its mostly illegal activities. A similar argument
was sometimes given to justify flat prohibitions of some imports, because that
way it was possible to know for sure that if those goods were found in
Colombia, they came from contraband. In fact, however, the customs office
often auctions off wholesale confiscated contraband items, thus providing
window dressing items covering up shadier deals.
The argument is also heard that large firms can use some imported capital
goods at fuller capacity than small ones. For example, import requests for
computers from small and medium-sized firms are known to have been denied
on the grounds that they could not use computers at full capacity. Similar
requests from larger firms have been approved. It is also argued, not without
reason, that bulk-buying abroad by large firms leads to dollar unit values for
imports lower than those which would be obtained by small firms.
The junta keeps flies of importers, including black or gray lists of those
caught in what it regards as illegal or undesirable practices. The total number
of importers is said to reach about 12,000; it will be seen in Chapter 6,
however, that the number of major importers is considerably less. Among
major private importers receiving particularly careful and sympathetic atten-
tion by the junta, incidentally, are those associated with mass communica-
tions, such as the press, radio, and television.
Ultimately, of course, the junta can argue that the pattern of imports
simply reflects industrial, financial, and geographical concentration in Colom-
bia, which they neither reinforce nor weaken significantly. The elimination of
import controls by itself is unlikely to change those structural facts, they add.
To this difficult issue we will return in the next chapter.
Given the location of the junta in Bogota, Bogota-based companies have
an edge in access over those located elsewhere. The presence of large
numbers of "Antioqueños" in top INCOMEX positions suggests that
requests by firms located in MedellIn are also likely to receive an especially
sympathetic hearing. Pleas from other cities, Cali in particular, for regional
offices with the power to decide on prior license imports have been turned
down mainly on the grounds that such offices would be more subject to
pressures originating in feelings of regional solidarity or in baser motives. At
present, only a few items on the free list can be registered at the 27
INCOMEX regional offices outside Bogota. The shuttling between provincial
centers and Bogota is regarded as a small price to pay for maintaining uniform
national standards and minimizing the chances of corruption creeping into the
decision-making process.
In a memo to the Minister of Development in December 1969 a group of
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excessive centralization of all governmental functions in Bogota, leading to
"innumerable trips to arrange trivial details." They argued that as a result,
many corporate headquarters, if not whole plants, were being moved from
t that valley to Bogota, depriving the fot mer of many important ancillary
activities, such as insurance, consulting, and publicity. INCOMEX was listed
as the government office causing the largest number of trivial trips; there were
others, however, such as the Superintendency of Prices, the Superintendency
of Corporations, IH, and the ministries of Health, Agriculture, Labor, and the
a Treasury(Tax Department). Centralized paper work associated with import
licenses was the main target. In the memo, it was urged that six regional
offices be given exchange quotas and be empowered to decide on license
r requests for spare parts, raw materials, and other inputs essential to keeping
tt production going, but it was conceded that decisions on new capital goods or
r peculiar cases should remain centralized in Bogota. It is noteworthy that this
group of businessmen asked for the decentralization of import controls, not
their abolition.
•,r It may be seen in Table 5-3that,according to the 1967 industrial census,
Bogota-based industrial firms did use on average more imported raw materials
g relative to their gross output than firms in the rest of the country. The textile
1 and paper industries of Antioquia, clustered in and around MedellIn, as well as
those producing rubber products and electrical equipment in Cali and sur-
roundings, however, surpassed Bogota firms in these activities in their relative
Es use of imported inputs.
It is generally admitted that requests under "commerce" are scrutinized
more rigorously and rejected more frequently than those under "industry."
1. This is partly due to the bias in favor of big, established firms, but also to a
feeling that items requested under commerce are less essential than the others.
,e Commerce, it is also argued, brings in a general variety of imports to add to
more or less ample stocks, and some delay is unlikely to harm very much of
anything, while industrial requests are of a specific nature and the materials
sought are expected to be put into the production process with little delay. At
al any rate, the pressing nature of industrial needs is easier to demonstrate than
that of commercial requests. Whatever the real reason, the effect of the
to difference in treatment is further to reinforce the bias against smaller industrial
firms, which rely more on commercial intermediaries (often large ones) for
•￿7 imported inputs than do the larger firms.
-al To summarize some of the problems of the small industrial firm, particu-
•m larly one located outside Bogota: In spite of its more difficult access to credit,
he its inventories as a percentage of sales tend to be higher than those of the
larger firms; attempts to lower inventories of imported items by relying on
of commercial intermediaries will be hampered by the greater difficulties of the
iut latter in obtaining permits, and by their charging premium-inclusive prices for142 IMPORT CONTROLS
Imported Raw Materials as Percentages of Value of Colombian Gross Manufacturing





Foodstuffs 7.9 16.4 7.8 6.5
Beverages 3.7 3.9 3.2 3.0
Tobacco products 2.5 3.3 2.0 2.3
Textiles 5.9 4.3 7.2 2.0
Clothing 0.6 1.2 0.3 1.4
Wood products except furniture 2.0 8.5 3.4 1.9
Furniture (wood) 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1
Paper and products 18.1 8.7 25.9 18.8
Printing and publishing 20.1 27.6 14.2 16.1
Leather products except shoes 5.0 5.1 6.0 5.5
Rubber products 33.6 21.3 12.3 40.5
Chemical products 28.3 33.5 33.5 27.0
Petroleum and coal products 4.9 44.4 0 0
Nonmetallic mineral products 7.4 5.0 5.4 4.6
Basic metal industries 9.1 51.2 10.5 7.6
Metal products except machinery 22.3 21.5 14.0 21.7
Nonelectrical machinery 13.6 20.2 13.7 5.6
Electrical machinery and appliances 27.6 25.2 20.0 34.3
Transport equipment 31.4 38.1 23.7 19.1
Other industries 21.5 24.2 14.0 22.0
Total manufacturing 12.2 19.2 9.8 14.2
those items for which permits have been obtained; attempts to lower imported
inventories involve the risk of stopping production at times of crisisif
INCOMEX fails to handle license requests quickly.
Applications in the "official," i.e., governmental, category are in princi-
ple subjected to the same procedure as others. As they involve duty-free
imports, special efforts have been made recently to ensure that goods which
are also produced locally are not brought into the country by this means.
Attempts to influence the junta by open flexing of political muscle appear to be
surprisingly limited. Import requests from the armed forces, the police, and
Congress, of course, receive sympathetic treatment, and rejections of these
requests are documented particularly well. But there areoccasionalrejections
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as well as from other powerful public agencies. On balance, however, there is
a presumption that official requests should be given priority, and they are said
to fare better than private requests, particularly at times of exchange strin-
gency.
Traditionally, nonreimbursable license requests are said to have had
better chances of approval than reimbursable ones, simply because they did
not involve immediate claims against the central bank for foreign exchange
and typically involved capital goods not produced in Colombia. Frequently,
they also involved large public-sector projects and international commit-
ments. More recently, however, both protectionist and equity considerations
have led to higher rates of refusal for nonreimbursable requests. The budding
Colombian capital goods industry has exerted pressure in this direction, also
pointing out the low duties and frequent exemptions on capital goods imports.
Local entrepreneurs have also loudly complained when direct foreign inves-
tors have been allowed to bring in under nonreimbursable licenses machinery
whose importation is not possible when requested under the reimbursable
category. It is correctly felt that such a situation puts the local industrialist at
an unfair disadvantage when competing in the local market with foreign-
owned firms. It may be noted that INCOMEX claims to follow a policy of
nondiscrimination between import requests from locally and foreign-owned
companies located within Colombia. At a more pedestrian level, the possibil-
ity of importing automobiles under nonreimbursable licenses, for example,
would lead according to INCOMEX to all kinds of illegal triangular deals. The
tendency, therefore, is to apply the same protectionist or equity criteria
whether or not the license request is reimbursable.
Searching for equity among established firms, the junta often handles
several import requests from different companies for a given product, particu-
larly critical raw materials, in one bunch. For example, when several beer
companies apply for imported hops, their requests are considered together, so
as to avoid giving one company advantages over the others simply on the basis
of a temporarily better access to imported inputs. In the case of newcomers to
if the industry, projected output is taken into consideration. For others, the
record of past levels of imports provides a first approximation to actual needs.
When some important raw material is both imported and produced locally,
ee and the latter is more expensive or of a lower quality than the former, mixing
rules are enforced; i.e., for each imported pound each company must purchase
- two locally, again to avoid giving companies unfair advantage based on better
be access to superior imported inputs. When there are no obviously equitable
arrangements possible there is a tendency to deny all requests; it is argued that
se it is better for all to do without imports than for a few to benefit from unfair
•ns advantages arising from a lucky access to the goods. Such favoritism, even if
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Caesar's wife, the junta knows that it must not only be honest, but appear
honest, even at the risk of being stern and unpleasant. The possibility of
auctioning off licenses is not considered to lie within the rules of the game.
GlobalLicenses.
r
In the case of requests for global licenses, covenng investment projects, i
the authorized department of INCOMEX is supposed to coordinate its study
of those projects with the National Planning Department. The Committee on
Global Licenses, which began operating during 1969, includes besides
INCOMEX and the Planning Department, the ministries of the Treasury and
of Development plus IFI, a public body that finances and sometimes runs a
industrial projects. There have been occasional episodes of bureaucratic
rivalry among the committee members. The Junta de Importaciones retains ti
the ultimate power to accept or reject the applications, and there have been g
cases where the junta has taken decisions contrary to the resolutions of the
mixed Committee on Global Licenses. The data required for global license
requests are extensive, and potentially permit a fairly comprehensive cost- C
benefit study of each project. The general impression, however, is that such
studies are not carried out, or at least not very thoroughly. There are only five
professionals in the Division of Global Licenses, each of whom is supposed to
study about five projects per week.9 However, this mechanism has been
increasingly used to ensure that new projects, particularly those granted tax or E
other advantages, commit part of their expected output for exports; for
several projects specific export targets have been laid down at the time of their
approval by INCOMEX in the form of formal contracts. It is not in the
INCOMEX style to insist rigidly on exact compliance with such targets, but r
the companies know that systematic departures from these promises can lead r
to a displeased and colder INCOMEX in the future.Until at least the comple-
tion of this study, once a global license had been obtained, ordinary requests
charged against it were typically granted almost automatically. Furthermore,
changes in the specifications of equipment to be imported were allowed with
relative ease. The processing of the global license request itself took an
average of about two months, although not surprisingly, there were substan-
tial variations from this average, depending on the nature of the project. It
may be noted that in reviewing global licenses INCOMEX examined the b
proposed ways of financing the imports and could suggest modifications.
The 19-page questionnaire which must still be completed in applying for
a global license is admittedly terrifying for a small entrepreneur, who in all TI
likelihood needs to hire a consultant to 1111it out. INCOMEX has been m
considering requiring a briefer questionnaire for smaller businessmen, but as da
of September 1971 this had not been done. goTHE OPERATION OF IMPORT CONTROLS DURING 1971 145
In many cases, at the same time that a project is being processed by
INCOMEX with an eye to import demand, it will also be analyzed by other
members of the Committee on Global Licenses and by the Committee on
Royalties—responsible for supervising royalty payments abroad—which
have other major preoccupations besides import demand. For example, all
major direct foreign investments in Colombia must by law be approved by the
Planning Projects financed by IFI will of course be examined by that
institution. As noted above, the coordination among different public agencies
in this area leaves much to be desired; overlap and conflict abound.
The mechanism for granting global licenses, originally designed among
other things to save paperwork and to avoid complications at customs, and the
Is associated gravamen ánico (single import duty) have come under increasing
Ic fire from within the government not only for lacking sufficient coordination in
iS their administration with bodies outside 1NCOMEX but also for excessive
generosity in reducing tariff rates on capital goods.
•
Other Operating Practices.
Ordinary and global licenses were normally examined by INCOMEX
following the chronological order of their presentation. Ordinary licenses were
to decided on usually within a month or a month and a half of presentation, while
for global licenses the waiting period was naturally longer and less predictable.
or Extensions and modifications of ordinary licenses took less than a month.
or INCOMEX claimed that urgent requests were handled even faster, if neces-
sary in a day, say, in cases where imported parts were essential to prevent
he production breakdowns. Rejections of applications were accompanied by the
Ut reason or reasons given by the junta for such a decision; seventy-two possible
•ad reasons were listed by the junta. Frequently, particularly during times of
severe exchange shortage, a reapplication will be rapidly made following the
;ts rejection, but during more relaxed times, as during 1971, the few rejections
were taken more seriously. Once approval was secured, and imports had
.th cleared customs, there was no particular difficulty in obtaining the foreign
an exchange for payment. With memories of the pile-up of commercial arrears in
tfl- 1955—56 and of the less dramatic situation in 1966—67 still fresh in their minds,
It the authorities have been careful in recent years not to issue import licenses
he beyond expected exchange earnings.
INCOMEX did not handle the further steps an importer had to take to
ror obtain foreign exchange to pay for his goods once they arrived in Colombia.
all This was the responsibility of the central bank, with which the importer had to
:en make a deposit in pesos equal to 95 per cent of the needed exchange, twenty
as days before making an application for an exchange registration. Proof that
goods had cleared customs also had to be presented. At this stage the request
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for exchange was granted quickly; the exchange disbursements took place
between one and twenty months after the merchandise had gone through
customs. The central bank, however, could double-check with INCOMEX on
unit dollar prices to prevent overinvoicing.
It is part of the INCOMEX style to avoid if possible having to issue a
formal refusal; so, particularly with global licenses, negative signals are often
sent informally, and the applications are seldom registered as rejections.
Furthermore, as its policies are by now fairiy well known, many potential
importers do not even bother to apply, saving themselves time, trouble, and
expense.'°
Ordinary import permits were for only five months;" if imports
were not brought in within that time, a new permit or a three-month exten-
sion of the old one had to be secured. It had been argued that such limitations
put the Colombian importer at a bargaining disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign
suppliers, who shade their prices upward because they are aware of the time
pressure faced by Colombians wanting to shop around. It is INCOMEX's
expectation that goods imported in the industrial category will be used only by
the company to which the license has been issued. When INCOMEX was
questioned about the legality of resales of merchandise imported for industrial
companies, its answers were surprisingly fuzzy. The license itself is clearly
non-negotiable, as itis issued only to a specific company or person. The
reselling of the imported items by industrial users is apparently not strictly
illegal, but it is frowned upon by INCOMEX, if only because it implies that
normal requirements stated in the Resolution 15 request form were misleading
or false. Companies shown to be systematically selling part of their imported
industrial inputs to others are punished by INCOMEX with total or partial
rejection of future requests. Similar punishment is dealt out to individuals or
companies discovered trying to import under several social or private names.
INCOMEX's point is that it wants to know exactly how many imports can be
traced to each industrial firm or individual. INCOMEX, however, does not
punish temporary swapping or lending of imported items among industrial
firms. Indeed, it finds such a practice quite reasonable, particularly if done
during periods of stringency and in a "nonspeculative" manner. Apparently,
during 1971 very little reselling or swapping of noncommercial imports took
place, although some INCOMEX officials indicated that that practice was
widespread during difficult years, e.g., 1967. Since most imports are pur-
chased directly by companies that use them as inputs in the production of
other commodities, arm's length market prices for these inputs are not
observed in Colombia. Consequently, it is difficult if not impossible to estab-
lish exactly the premiums attached to import licenses, premiums which in any
case are very likely to fluctuate sharply between years (e.g., between 1967 and
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It also follows that it is difficult to establish the meaning of price control
for imported industrial inputs. In the case of commercial imports, according to
regulations INCOMEX should theoretically coordinate its activities with the
Superintendencia de Precios (Price Control Board) to determine the margin at
a which imported goods are resold, i.e., to control the premiums derived from
licenses. Such control, however, is very sporadic and unsystematic, and takes
place mainly when somebody makes public a scandal about excessive mar-
11 gins. Nevertheless, INCOMEX claims that import controls are superior to
d tariffs, among other reasons because they avoid making imports more expen-
sive, a doubtful claim in view of the loose control over the license premiums.
Conventional wisdom in Colombia regards the profitability of large importing
commercial houses as very high; in particular, hardware stores selling imports
are popularly considered to be "gold mines." Nevertheless, the junta argues
that it tries to spread out import permits among commercial importers as much
e and as fairly as it can.
There are more or less subtle ways by which the junta discriminates
according to country of origin of potential imports. Requests to import televi-
sion sets from Spain, for example, are said to have a better chance of approval
than requests to import from the United States, both because Spain has a
bilateral payments agreement with Colombia and because the authorities
consider that the local industry will have an easier time competing with
Spanish than with U.S. sets. Even where there are no explicit bilateral
agreements, the junta de facto administers "gentlemen's agreements" with
countries such as Japan, which make purchases from Colombia that are
outside coffee agreement channels in exchange for Colombian commitments
al to import their goods. These games, of course, are also played by countries
without explicit generalized import controls, even if they preach multilateral
s. trade, particularly to partners with whom their balance-of-payments account
shows a surplus. Some Colombian officials complain that socialist countries
with which Colombia has bilateral payments agreements that are typically in
al surplus do not advertise their goods as vigorously as they might among
potential importers. Often, the junta has to nudge importers so that they will
divert their purchases to those countries; requests for licenses to import from
)k those countries are granted more readily than requests to import from, say,
the dollar area. But the quantitative importance of such trade remains small.
As shown in Chapter 3, during 1967—69, less than 3 per cent of Colombian
of imports came from socialist countries.
ot As the Colombian foreign-exchange position improved during 1971 and
b- 1972, the role of U.S. tied aid declined. The use of import controls to en-
force tying also declined accordingly. In earlier years, however, INCOMEX
and related institutions took strong measures to divert purchases toward U.S.
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prior deposit requirements, and direct pressure on importers to buy from
the United States. Those were the days of bitter wrangling over "positive"
and "negative" lists, and "additionality."12 U.S. officials were in the awk-
ward position of simultaneously urging Colombians to liberalize import con-
trols, to use controls to enforce tying, and to stop using controls to divert
imports toward bilateral partners, such as Spain and the socialist countries.
The Treaty of Cartagena, which created the Andean group, calls for the
elimination of administrative import restrictions among member countries.
Colombia has been keeping her side of that bargain, and only routine registra-
tion requirements are required for imports from Andean countries.
The INCOMEX Image.
The INCOMEX performance in about 1971 was generally praised by
industrial entrepreneurs interviewed during the middle part of that year. In
almost all cases they compared it very favorably with the pre-1967 situation,
about which stories were told that typically associated delays, corruption, and
inefficiency with import controls. The flexibility, efficiency, and honesty of
INCOMEX were also compared favorably with those of customs. It should be
borne in mind, however, that most of these entrepreneurs came from rela-
tively large companies, and that the foreign-exchange situation was quite
relaxed during 1971, especially in contrast with 1967 and earlier years. The
major complaint against INCOMEX deals with imports of spare parts, for
which delays of even one month in the handling of import requests are a
nuisance. Frequently, small spare parts are simply smuggled into the country
by employees sent specially for that purpose to Miami and New York. It may
be noted that the free- or black-market peso rate during 1971 was only about
15 per cent above the certificate rate and less than that during 1972; so using
exchange from this source was not very expensive. INCOMEX, of course, is
aware of these goings-on and has been considering ways of legalizing the
situation, such as expanding the "minor" import category, under which
imports worth less than $20 (less than $40 for books) are now allowed without
prior license or registration.
Entrepreneurs, particularly those in charge of large companies, find
INCOMEX on the whole a bulwark against foreign competition and at the
same time an even more reliable supplier of cheap imported inputs. During
197 1—72, the few controversies between entrepreneurs and INCOMEX dealt
more with imports the latter had allowed to come into the country than with
denials of import requests.
Apart from the smuggling of spare parts and some consumer goods,
such as furs, perfumes, jewelry, and cigarettes, INCOMEX feels that the
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importers know what to expect. Its officials argue, not without reason, that the
combination of moderate tariffs plus import controls forms a more powerful
barrier to smuggling than a situation with higher tariffs and no import controls.
A key element in their reasoning is that, as more items are shifted from the
prohibited list to the prior license list, more uncertainty will be planted in the
minds of would-be smugglers, whose profit margins could be reduced or wiped
out if INCOMEX suddenly permits imports of moderately taxed goods.
The performance of the INC OMEX import control system has a good
reputation even outside Colombia; officials from other Latin American coun-
tries have visited Bogota to study it for possible application in their own
countries.
One may wonder how well the INCOMEX import control system, which
some observers find even more centralized than Soviet-type planning, would
have performed during 1967—72 if foreign exchange had been less plentiful, or
the quality of the members of the Junta de Importaciones had not been as high
as it was. In a way, INCOMEX during the years under study represented
I some of the positive facets of elitist rule in Colombia. A more decentralized
import control system, more open to rising entrepreneurs, would have led in
all likelihood to an informal auctioning off of licenses by extralegal means.
SOME EVIDENCE OF THE COMBINED
r OPERATION OF THE IMPORT-REPRESSING
MECHANISMS
The presence of duties, prior deposits, and import controls has led to a
t substantial gap between the domestic and world market prices of importable
g goods. That part of the gap corresponding to the premium attributable to
import licenses has fluctuated sharply from year to year and from product to
• product, but data on its exact magnitude are scanty. The most systematic
comparison between Colombian and world prices has been carried out by
t Thomas L. Hutcheson13 for a sample of commodities during 1969. Evidence
from this study on the resource allocation effects of the Colombian system of
U protection will be analyzed in Chapter 8; here the evidence on the interaction
e of tariffs and import controls and on the average gap between domestic and
g foreign prices will be discussed.
•It In the sample of 385 products, the average gap between domestic and
Li foreign prices at the going import exchange rate was 47 per cent, as may be
seen in Table 5-4.Onbalance, there was "water" in the tariff, as the average
•s, duty was 71 per cent. But such water was concentrated in goods produced by
••e the more traditional and established branches of Colombian manufacturing,




Tariffs,Import Regimes, and Gaps Between Domestic and International Prices, 1969
Excess of
Domestic
over Ad Valorem Import
International Import Regime Number of
Prices Duty Classification"Observations
Mainly foodstuffs and beverages 25% 85% 2.7 52
Textiles, clothing, furniture,
leather, and paper products 47 113 2.5 89
Chemical, rubber, glass, and
other nonmetallic mineral
products 46 56 2.1 79
Other manufactured goods 55 52 2.0 165
All products 47 71 2.2 385
SOURCE: Computed from data kindly made available by Thomas L. Hutcheson.
a. Dummies for import regime classification are as follows: I for the free list, 2 for the prior license list, and 3
for the prohibited list.
less, at [east for this sample and on average, the premiums generated by the
import licensing system even for less traditional items such as those under
"other manufactured goods" were small during 1969.
Since regressions intended to explain the domestic-international price gap
as a function of import duties and a dummy for the import regime (see Table 5-
4, note a) yield very poor results, the averages shown in Table 5-4shouldbe
taken with great caution. The only t statistics higher than 1.0 are those for the
tariff variable in the group of other manufactured goods (a positive t ratio of
1.38) and for the import regime dummy in the group of chemical, rubber,
glass, and other nonmetallic mineral products (a positive tratio of 1.53).
These data, however, confirm a strong positive correlation between the import
duty and the stringency of the import regime for the whole sample and for
each of the groups considered except for other manufactured goods.
NOTES
1. The lists are formally approved by the Superior Council of Foreign Trade (Consejo
Superior de Corriercio Exterior) on the advice of INCOMEX, which acts as its technical
secretariat. That council is presided over by the Minister of Development, and also includes the
ministers of Foreign Relations, the Treasury, and Agriculture plus the head of the Planning Office,
the manager of the central bank, the manager of the Coffee Growers' Federation, the manager of
IFI, the director of PROEXPO, and the director of INCOMEX. This group also forms the core of






ministersof Public Works and of Labor. These two councils plus the Junta Monetaria form the
three key policymaking bodies in the economic field. The director of INCOMEX is a member of
the three bodies. Within INCOMEX, which covers all aspects of foreign trade, the Junta de
Importaciones handles the import control system.
2. Resolution 22 of September 22, 1970, also limits the free list to the reimbursable category
and to commodities originating in the same country where they have been purchased. The free list
applicable to LAFTA countries is somewhat larger than that described above.
3. This section is heavily based on the IMP's annual Reporton Exchange Restrictions andon
interviews with Colombian officials and with officials in several inter-American and international
institutions.
4. All import registrations were divided as follows:
OfficialMarket Fiee
Government Private Market
1955 21% 75% 4%
1956 21 •58 21
19571 18 67 15
5. My remarks on INCOMEX usually refer both to formal regulations and informal opinions
of INCOMEX officials interviewed during July—September 1971 and August 1972. In fact, the
Junta de Importaciones is only one part of the INCOMEX organization, which also covers other
aspects of foreign trade.
6. The impressive evidence on overinvoicirig in pharmaceuticals and other industries is
discussed in Constantine V. Vaitsos, de Recursos y PreservaciOn de Rentas
r MonopolIsticas." Rei'istade Planeación yDesarrollo(publishedby the National Planning Depart.
ment, Bogota), July 1971, pp. 35—72. For the pharmaceutical companies in the sample overinvoic-
ing averaged 155 per cent. Overinvoicing is also said to occur in items such as books and machine
tools, for which it is more difficult to ascertain exact prices because of quality differences and
heterogeneity of specifications. Exchange control is used by Colombian authorities to keep close
e tabson payments for patents and royalties.
e 7.There are similarities between the Colombian style of import controls and the operating
manner of committees in charge of undergraduate admissions in places like Yale University,
where demand also exceeds supply. At both places there is great resistance to formalized quotas,
regarded as rigid, and a tendency to fudge criteria until they become shapeless—a subjective Jell-
0. Those making the control decisions resent any attempt at defining clear-cut objective rules,
which are easily enough shown to be unable to cover fairly all possible cases, even when those
r rules would yield the same results as the committee's judgment in 95 per cent of all cases. For the
sake of that 5percent of power, the administrators prefer gentlemanly ambiguity.
8. In July 1973 a spectacular fire destroyed the INCOMEX offices there, including import
control records. Since then, however, INCOMEX has found new offices, not as high but just as
plush.
9.INCOMEXargues that, even though its staff may not have time to carry out careful cost-
benefit studies, the process of requesting massive data from entrepreneurs planning a new project
10 will force businessmen to rethink their venture carefully. This is but one example of the somewhat
al paternalistic attitude often found among INCOMEX officials. In some cases the study of a given
project is reduced to a quick visit to the plant proposing an enlargement. INCOMEX expects that
e, requests for global licenses will involve projects in a fairly advanced state of study by the firm.
Df 10. In 1971, all requests for import licenses had to be accompanied by a 100-peso fee and,
of more recently, by an additional 50-peso charge (a total of about U.S. $7). The paperwork required
for making an application must also represent a small but significant expense for companies,152 IMPORTCONTROLS
particularly in the case of global licenses. Such an expense is likely to be proportionally higher for
smaller firms. INCOMEX finances itself partly out of the import license fees, which give it
additional autonomy in contrast to government agencies more dependent on the national budget.
11. When approval is granted to an import request, copies of the import registration are sent
to the central bank, the Customs office, and the Colombian consul nearest the foreign city from
which the goods are to be shipped. The Colombian consul may not issue the required shipping
authorization without that document..
12. See Thomas L. Hutcheson and Richard C. Porter. TheCost ofTying Aid: A Method and
Some Colombian Estimates, Princeton Studies in International Finance 30 (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, March 1972), particularly pp. 17—20. The infamous "additionality"
clause in U.S. aid was abolished during the visit of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo to the United
States in June 1969.
13. The results of his work are summarized in Thomas L. Hutcheson, "Incentives for
Industrialization in Colombia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1973). 1 am most grateful to
Hutcheson for making his unpublished basic data available to me. For a description of those
data, see Appendix B of his thesis.